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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM*
By

PAUL C. WEILER*

Mr. Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court once remarked
that "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges
say it is."' This is almost a truism in American constitutional law and we
have it on the authority of our own Mr. Justice Hall that the situation is
the same in Canada. 2 I believe that the statement is essentially correct and
I certainly approve of this frank recognition by judges of their own
responsibility for the constitutional decisions they are making. What I would
like to do today, though, is to delve deeper into the legal situation which is
reflected in this remark and ask some of the questions it suggests to the
student of the courts, if not to the constitutional lawyers. What is there about
constitutional law which makes the judicial responsibility so predominant?
Should such a constitutional role lead to a redesigning of the Supreme Court
along the lines of a specialized "constitutional court?" Finally, and most
important, do we really want, or do we really need, in a federal system, the
kind of constitutional umpire whose performance is, I think, aptly conveyed
by Hughes J.'s comment?
I shall begin my analysis by a sketch of a case study - our recent
constitutional cause c~l~bre arising out of the "chicken and egg war". 3 This
was primarily an engagement fought by the bordering provinces of Ontario
and Quebec. Ontario farmers produced an abundance of cheap eggs and
Quebec farmers an abundance of cheap chickens. The surplus producers were
naturally interested in the market of the consumers in the neighbouring
jurisdiction. Equally naturally, though, the somewhat less efficient producers
of each product were not so enamoured of competition within their own
bailiwick. When they went to their own government for protection, the result
was the creation of marketing schemes under enabling legislation. These
provided for the controlled marketing, at fixed prices, of all the chickens sold
-,This lecture was delivered at the Osgoode Hall Law School on 19 January 1972
and has been reprinted with the kind permission of the Osgoode Hall Law School.
Professor Weiler's lecture, together with the other lectures of the same series, have now
been published in book form under the title of Law and Social Change (Osgoode Hall
Law School, 1973).
**Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1 Quoted from Pusey, Hughes, at 204.

2In an unpublished lecture Law Reform and the Judiciary'sRole given at the Osgoode
Hall Law School on September 29, 1971.
3 For the political background to the court's decision I have relied essentially on
newspaper accounts throughout 1971. One of the best such stories was in the Financial
Post of May 29, 1971, at 1 and 6. The Supreme Court of Canada decision is reported
under the name The Attorney-General for Manitoba v. The Manitoba Egg and Poultry
Association, [1971] S.C.R. 689, affirming the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision reported
at (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 326.
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in Ontario and all the eggs in Quebec, whatever the source. Unfortunately,
it appears that the marketing boards became a little greedy and went even
further to give undue preference in marketing to those products coming from
within the province. Even worse, this had adverse effects on producers in other
provinces such as Manitoba, which, as a consistent producer of agricultural
surpluses, was the classic innocent and injured bystander in the "chicken and
egg war".
On the surface, I find it rather hard to see what the courts have to
contribute to the resolution of this essentially political and economic conflict.
There certainly was ample scope for bargaining and negotiating terms of
settlement which might offer at least something to everyone. One could understand that the federal government, which represented producers and consumers
from all affected jurisdictions, might have been an appropriate arbiter. Unfortunately, earlier judicial decisions of the twenties and the thirties had
themselves created the very institutional gaps which fostered such interprovincial marketing conflicts. 4 At this very time though, the federal government
was attempting to shepherd through Parliament a new Farm Products
Marketing Act which would attempt to ameliorate these deficiencies through
a complicated process of inter-administrative delegation. 5 Though there
appeared to be substantial consensus in favour of the general scheme of the
Bill by both federal and provincial ministers of agriculture, it was being
delayed by opposition members who largely represented western farming
interests. In the interim, the federal government had carefully resisted many
calls to refer the "political" dispute to the Supreme Court of Canada for
immediate "legal" resolution.
Unfortunately, Manitoba, which was understandably loath to wait for a
political decision on the larger questions, devised a scheme for circumventing
this reluctance of the federal Justice Minister. This provincial government
manufactured a controversy by initiating, through a proposed Order-inCouncil, a carbon copy of the Quebec scheme, providing for Manitoba control
of the marketing of extra-provincial eggs in Manitoba. It then referred these
regulations to the Manitoba Court of Appeal for a decision about their constitutionality, under its own provincial reference legislation. When the Manitoba
Court of Appeal decision was unfavourable as to the constitutional validity
of the scheme, the Manitoba government was entitled as of right to appeal this
"loss" to the Supreme Court of Canada. In this way, it could achieve a binding
decision as to all such schemes which would be authoritative in all the
provinces.
4

The important decisions were Eastern Terminal Elevator v. The King, [1925]
S.C.R. 434, Lawson v. InteriorFruit Committee, [1931] A.C. 357 and Attorney-General
for B.C. v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1937] A.C. 377. Other significant decisions
limiting the trade and commerce power in related areas were In Re Board of Commerce
Act, [1922] A.C. 191 and Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
The sad story is told in A. Smith, The Commerce Power in Canadaand the United States
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1963), and R. E. Johnston, The Effect of Judicial Review on
Federal-State Relations in Australia, Canada and the United States (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969), ch. VI.
5 Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, S.C. 1971, c. F-65, previously Bill C-176,
28 Parl., 3rd Sess.
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Questions might be asked about the propriety of this apparent subversion
of the adversary process when the Manitoba government purported to argue
for, and then appeal on behalf of, laws which it was proposing to enact for
the sole purpose of having them declared unconstitutional. Of more general
and recurring concern, though, are the deficiencies of the Reference device
itself which the Manitoba government was attempting to utilize in order to get
this political and economic dispute settled.6 If there are any two characteristics
of the judicial process which give it some qualifications to resolve constitutional issues, they are that the disputes arise in a concrete factual setting and
are adjudicated by a neutral impartial arbiter. Because a very specific factsituation triggers the litigation which appeals to a court for a constitutional
ruling, the judge has the benefit of being able to focus on the real-life
implications of the decision he is making and thus to carefully tailor and limit
the reach of the determination as he sees fit. Moreover, the neutrality of the
judge is preserved by an adversary process which requires the interested
parties to bring the relevant factual background before the Court, depicted in
as favourable a light as possible from each point of view.
In the Manitoba Reference, both of these advantages of adjudication
were dissipated. There was no concrete focus around which the reasoning
of the court could be organized, nor was the factual economic background
to the statute depicted. The Manitoba government conspicuously omitted
to set out in the Reference the relevant economic background which might
well have supported the reasonability of provincial action in the area. Ontario
and Quebec, which were vitally interested in sustaining this kind of legislation,
did not have an opportunity to present this factual support. Indeed, the
questions which the Manitoba government posed to the Court did not focus
on what appears to have been the real character of the dispute - the
discriminatory application of provincial marketing quotas against out-ofprovince producers - and instead required the Court to make a blanket
decision about the legality of any such marketing scheme, no matter how
favourably it might be applied to extra-provincial products. In my opinion,
the most sensible response would have been a forthright refusal to answer the
questions on the grounds that the dispute was not appropriate for judicial
resolution. One senses that Mr. Justice Laskin, who was especially critical of
the abstract character of the Reference, was drawn in this direction, but
eventually the legal mystique surrounding issues of federalism overcame his
reluctance. The majority opinion proceeded blithely ahead, without any
apparent concern for the complex and inter-related political or economic
interests involved in the dispute, and the Court gave Manitioba the broad
legal weapon it was hoping for.
Are there any inadequacies in the substantive reasoning and results of
the Court which may reflect some of these procedural deficiencies? A casual
reading of the opinion certainly indicates the truth of Hughes' dictum that
"the constitution is what the judges say it is". In the first place, the Supreme
Court is attempting to work out a distinction between regulation of interprovincial and intra-provincial trade. However, this is a purely judicial gloss
6

The law and policy relating to the Reference device in Canada is canvassed in
B. Strayer, JudicialReview of Legislation in Canada (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1968), ch. 7.
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on the text of the B.N.A. Act, which has become constitutional dogma with
little real assessment of the reasons for it. It began with Citizens Insurance v.
Parsons,7 a Privy Council decision which upheld the validity of fairly
innocuous provincial legislation regulating the terms of insurance contracts.
In order to do so, the Court excluded provincial intervention from the
economy only when it amounted to "regulation of trade in matters of interprovincial concern". Soon this formula became constitutional dogma for the
converse problem - determining the ambit of valid dominion legislation.
Because there has never been any real assessment of the reasons why we
should have such a judge-made allocation of legislative authority, it is not
surprising that the courts have never discovered how to apply it in anything
but a wooden and legalistic way.
The underlying functional problem is that consumers of farm products,
who are making purchases through a national currency and credit system,
cannot meaningfully be regulated by a legislative body which has jurisdiction
over some portion only of the undifferentiated products which are being
marketed to them. If the federal government alone can control the marketing
of extra-provincial products or trade and the provincial government alone
can control intra-provincial products or transactions, then there will have to
be substantial identity in the content of co-ordinated legislation in order that
the regulatory goals of either can be achieved. Otherwise the supply of
unregulated goods will frustrate the orderly marketing and price supports
which are the major thrust of current farm policy. However, the attainment
of co-operation always faces the obstacle of possible federal disinterest in a
relatively localized problem, or a parochial local veto of legislation desired
by the federal government and a majority of the provinces. Hence, the requirement of co-operative action is always risky, time-consuming, and in the
interests of those who do not want to be regulated, and who win from a
governmental decision not to intervene, whether it comes on the merits or
not.
This is the economic background to the various statutory schemes which
came up for constitutional review in the light of this concept of "interprovincial trade". A lengthy series of precedents sustained the constitutionality
of non-discriminatory, provincial schemes for the orderly marketing of
products within their borders, whatever the source of destination. In Shannon
v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board,8 the Privy Council upheld compulsory marketing of milk through provincial boards situate in the province,
and considered it quite unimportant that some of this milk was produced
outside the province. Shortly afterwards, in Home Oil DistributorsLtd. v.
A.-G. British Columbia,9 the Supreme Court upheld provincial fixing of
minimum and maximum prices of gasoline and fuel oil in reliance on
Shannon. It was clear from extrinsic evidence that this legislation was aimed
at extra-provincial (in fact foreign) producers who were dumping surplus
fuel oil in B.C. at such low prices that it was destructive to the B.C. coal
industry, and who were recovering their losses from extortionate prices charged
7 [1881]

7 A.C. 96 at 113.
8 [1938] A.C. 708 at 717.

9 [1940] S.C.R. 444.

1973]

S.C.C. and CanadianFederalism

for gasoline, for which there was no local alternative. The Court simply
applied the formula that the regulation applied only to products once they
were inside the province and said that if the plaintiffs "desire to carry on their
business in the Province of British Columbia, they must comply with provincial
laws in common with all provincial and independent dealers in the same
commodities". In the face of these two precedents, it would seem difficult
indeed for the Supreme Court to hold the Manitoba scheme invalid under
existing law.
However, some retreat from the very wide compass given to provincial
powers might have been seen in the Ontario Farm Products ReferenceO
which dealt with the opposite side of the marketing coin - provincial
competence over locally-produced products destined for outside the province.
The Court for the first time appeared to recognize that there are few, if any,
marketing transactions which cannot be described, at least abstractly, as taking
place within one province, while there are few intra-provincial transactions
which do not have ramifications outside the province. Some judges tried to lay
down certain dividing lines as to when a product could be said to be in interprovincial trade and thus outside provincial control. The important factor
appeared to be whether the products were intended to be sold, directly or
indirectly (i.e., after processing) to consumers within that province. Unfortunately, the very abstract character of this Reference" deprived these efforts of
any real significance, as was indicated by the next case, Carnation Company
Ltd. v. The Quebec AgriculturalMarketing Board12 - involving real facts and
a concrete dispute.
In the Carnation case, a Canadian incorporated company with its head
office in Toronto, operated in Quebec both a receiving station for milk and
a processing plant. It bought raw milk from about 2,000 farmers in the
relevant area, sent most of it to the plant to be processed into evaporated milk,
and skimmed some of the milk and sent it to be processed in an Ontario plant.
The major consumer market for the evaporated milk was outside Quebec.
Under provincial marketing legislation, a majority of area milk producers
organized a marketing plan which regulated all sales of raw milk to Carnation
Co., with provision for government arbitration of price in case of nonagreement. It appeared as a result that Carnation had to pay a significantly
greater price for raw milk than other purchasers from the same area and
eventually Carnation objected to the constitutionality of an arbitration award.
However, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Martland J., upheld
the provincial scheme on the theory that each transaction and each regulation
must be examined in relation to its own facts:
In the present case, the orders under question were not, in my opinion, directed
at the regulation of inter-provincial trade. They did not purport directly to control
or to restrict such trade. There was no evidence that, in fact, they did control or
restrict it. The most that can be said of them is that they had some effect upon
the cost of losing business in Quebec of a company engaged in inter-provincial
trade, and that, by itself, is not sufficient to make them invalid. 13
10 [1957] S.C.R. 198.
11 See discussion in Strayer, supra, note 6 at 178-79.
12 [1968] S.C.R. 238 at 253.
13 Id., at 254.
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In the face of this decision, I suggest that it would be very difficult to
invalidate the proposed Manitoba Egg scheme and, in order to do so, the
Court would have to make and justify a very substantial change in the
direction of Canadian constitutional law. Of course, the two older cases,
Shannon and Home Oil were directly on point and firmly in favour of
provincial jurisdiction. Whatever hints to the contrary we might have seen
in the Ontario FarmProducts Reference, dealing with an analogous situation,
seemed put to rest by the Carnation case. Yet the Court, without a hint that
it was doing any more than following a long, unbroken line of decisions,
turned around and held the Manitoba scheme invalid. The majority opinion
of the Court was again written by Mr. Justice Martland, and the sum total
of his reasoning to this conclusion is contained in the following passage:
It is my opinion that the plan now in issue not only affects inter-provincial trade in
eggs, but that it aims at the regulation of such trade. It is an essential part of this
scheme, the purpose of which is to obtain for Manitoba producers the most advantageous marketing conditions for eggs, specifically to control and regulate the sale
in Manitoba of imported eggs. It is designed to restrict or limit the free flow of

trade between provinces as such. Because of that, it constitutes an invasion of the
Parliament of Canada over the matter of the
exclusive legislative authority of the
14
regulation of trade and commerce.
In my opinion, this argument is completely question-begging, as a
response to the legal authority even if Carnationdecided less than three years
before (let alone the older but more direct precedents of Shannon and Home
Oil). No doubt there are factual distinctions between the two marketing
schemes, but I do not believe that there are meaningful economic differences
relevant to the central legal issue: should one province have the power to
control agricultural marketing inside its boundaries when this necessarily
affects or "concerns" the interests of citizens in other provinces? I will
indicate my reasons for this statement shortly but I should first point out
that even if I am wrong in this judgment, there is not one sentence in the
majority opinion which purports to show why one scheme is valid but the
other is not. Instead, we are given only labels - "affects" inter-provincial
trade or "aims at the regulation" of such trade. These the individual judges
apply in some mysterious fashion to produce a result which they tell us is the
law, or at least the law for the time being.
What is the functional or economic significance of the scheme in the
Manitoba Egg Reference and how does it compare to that in Carnation?
Manitoba producers were authorized to create marketing boards composed
of people elected by them and charged with achieving the most advantageous
marketing for their product. To this end the boards were given powers to
market all eggs sold in the province, and to require the grading, packing and
marketing of all such eggs at a station, the operation of which is under the
control of the board. All eggs coming from outside the province were subject
to the scheme and the place of origin of such eggs was to be marked on the
container. No doubt the major problem in this legislation was that it could
be administered in a discriminatory fashion (and, as I have said, apparently
was so operated in other provinces.) If extra-provincial eggs were not given
a fair share of marketing quotas, and were kept out of provincial markets
14Supra, note 3 at 703.
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until provincial eggs were sold, this would be an obvious reason for invalidating the legislation in operation. 15 However, actual discrimination was not
the assumption on which the Reference was made, argued, and decided and
the dangerous character of the decision is that it seems to bar subjection of
products to even a fairly-administered provincial regulatory
extra-provincial
16
scheme.
The economic purpose of this kind of marketing legislation is protection
of the markets and prices of Manitoba producers at the expense of Manitoba
consumers. In order to achieve this result of price supports and orderly
marketing in an undifferentiated market for eggs, it is necessary to subject
producers from other provinces to the same limitations in dealing with
Manitoba distributors. On the other hand, the purpose of the legislation in
Carnation is to protect Quebec producers, at the expense of mainly nonQuebec consumers, without any limitation on non-Quebec producers. In the
final analysis, the only difference is that in Carnationthe wholesale marketing
and prices of Quebec milk are controlled by Quebec law - whether it is
destined for inside or outside Quebec - while in the Manitoba Egg case, all
eggs sold in Mantoba are to be marketed and priced under Manitoba controls,
whether they come from within or without Manitoba. Yet Martland J.decided
that, "on its own facts", the Manitoba legislation is in relation to trade and
commerce, as well as affecting it, and thus unconstitutional. As to the
Carnationscheme, again, "on its own facts" he said it merely had some effect
on inter-provincial trade, and was valid. If there is a difference, which is
relevant to the federal division of legislative power, it is not apparent to me,
and certainly not adverted to on the face of the opinion.
Laskin, J.'s opinion is much more sophisticated, especially in recognizing
the difficulties faced in trying to answer such a question of constitutionality
on a Reference with no supporting factual or economic data. However,
unfortunately, he does not appear to consider the possibility that, in such a
situation, discretion may be the better part of valour. He says that the
"proposed scheme has as a direct object the regulation of the importation of
eggs, and it is not saved by the fact that the local market is under the same
regime". 7 His only practical reason for holding this to be invalid is that it
denies "one of the objects of Confederation... namely to form an economic
unit of the whole of Canada." Unfortunately, he does not tell us why this is
the case for this kind of legislation and not so in Carnation,and, in any event,
what are the evils in a non-discriminatory provincial scheme for controlled
marketing and price supports for all eggs sold in the province, whatever their
source.

The functional problem which the Court is required to face in the case is
the degree of latitude which a province should be allowed in subjecting the
151 might add that section 121 of the B.N.A. Act would likely make this unconstitutional, even for the federal government. See the discussion by Rand, J.in Murphy v.
C.P.R., [1958] S.C.R. 626 at 638 ff.
16 However, Mr. Justice Pigeon, in a cryptic concurring opinion (at 723), agreed with
the majority conclusion only for the explicit reason that the scheme enabled the Board
to use quotas to give preference to sale of local eggs, even if this might mean a total
prohibition on the sale of out-of-province eggs.
17 Supra, note 3 at 717.
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business sector of our society to regulation within its borders. As a matter
of plain, economic facts, the inter-dependent nature of business activity in
this country is such that almost all provincial regulations will have ramifications
on citizens and enterprises outside the country, whether or not the legal rule
technically applies only to purely intra-provincial trade or transactions. Moreover, the citizens of these provinces, who are so affected by these regulatory
decisions, have no real say in the election of the representative governments
which make them. Hence the arguments which can be made for judicial
laissez-faire with respect to democratically-elected parliaments do not have
the same weight as in many of the other constitutional areas decided by the
Court.
Interestingly enough, although our Supreme Court has never looked for
illumination in American cases, since 1949 there has been a very sophisticated
debate about the proper judicial role in controlling state-enacted "burdens"
on inter-state commerce. 18 One position - that of Jackson - takes the view
that if a state enacts a law which imposes a significant burden on commerce
within the national free-trade economic unit, it should be struck down. Black,
at the other pole, holds that if the state has a reasonable interest of its own
in the object of the regulation, and the law does not attempt to discriminate
against out-of-state business as such, it should be upheld. An interim position
- formulated by Stone and probably reflective of the majority view in the
Court and among academic commentators- holds that the Court should
balance the legitimate benefits achieved by the states from the regulations
against the burdens inflicted on inter-state commerce and only invalidate the
law if the latter exceeds the former.
This brief statement of the opposing positions does not of course convey
a sense of the detailed and sophisticated examination undertaken by the U.S.
Supreme Court in making these inquiries. It is clear, though, from a comparison of the reasoning and results in Carnationand the Manitoba Reference,
that our Court is either incapable of, or unwilling to perform the same
function. If the Court had taken Black's approach, I believe both schemes
would be held valid (at least on their face), while if they took Jackson's
approach, both would be held invalid. If Stone's intermediate view was
adopted, the Court would have had to weigh the competing interests of the
legislating province in the respective schemes and those of the nation in the
free flow of a national fair market. What we received though was only a
judicial ipse dixit which may have authoritatively resolved the dispute- in
the way Manitoba wanted - but did so with no supporting reasoning.
There are some observers who will not be troubled by this, and will
believe that what the Court says is law and must be followed, and that is
the end of that. Unfortunately others, especially those adversely affected by
this "law", will ask why they should unquestioningly accept the initiative
judgments of the Court. Ontario and Quebec will simply say that they believe
their legislation is somewhat different from that involved in the Manitoba
18 A recent book by P. R. Benson, The Supreme Court and the Commerce Clause
(New York: Dunellen, 1970) has an excellent discussion of the different positions in
Chapter 7. Perhaps the leading case illustrating the alternative views is Southern Pacific v.
Arizona ex rel Sullivan (1945), 325 U.S. 761.
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Reference and there is no principle or reasoning in the latter case which can
indicate whether or not these distinctions are specious. In any event, it seems
that shortly afterwards the affected governments met and engaged in some
serious bargaining which was directed toward the real conflicts and problems
in the area. This was to be expected because it is hard to see how the "winner
take all" kind of judicial decision could be an acceptable basis for resolving a
very complex problem involving not only a conflict between different groups
of producers, but an equally vital conflict between producers and consumers
who vote in the same province. The most intriguing comment made just
before the meeting of the ministers of agriculture was that they were all agreed
then on just one thing - that the Supreme Court decision would not be the
basis of their final settlement. 19
What is the significance of the Manitoba Egg Reference? I believe the
case is typical of the very complicated political and economic conflicts which
are the "stuff" of constitutional adjudication. Even more, it suggests the
paradoxical character of "government by lawsuit" as the preferred technique
for resolving these conflicts. Why do we have the institution of judicial review
19
In my experience, it is the layman who is most often caught up in the mystique
of the theory that whatever a court says is law, and because it is the law it must be obeyed.
The following editorial in the Toronto Daily Star about the governmental negotiations
relating to the Manitoba Egg case is instructive in this regard:

DEFIANCE OF LAW IN CHICKEN WAR.
"An ominous note -at least for any Canadian who hopes for the survival of a united
Canada - was struck at the opening yesterday of a conference of four provinces and a
federal representative to consider the inter-provincial trade war over chickens and eggs.
The conference was held in the wake of a Supreme Court of Canada decision that a
Manitoba statute restricting the import of eggs from Quebec was unconstitutional because
it dealt with trade between the provinces, a subject reserved to the national government
under the British North America Act. Since the Manitoba statute was virtually a carbon
copy of the Quebec Act which started the trouble, the judgment obviously renders the
Quebec legislation invalid as well. The normal reaction of a provincial government, when
confronted with such a court decision, has always been to accept the verdict and abandon
the unconstitutional law.
But the present Quebec cabinet is reacting differently. As the conference opened, a Quebec
spokesman had this to say. "This meeting will start on the premise that the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision brought about by a Manitoba action is not to be regarded as a
guideline for settlement. It is hoped that an agreement can be negotiated amicably that will
end any further need for recourse to the courts."
Apparently Quebec means to ignore the Supreme Court decision and go on enforcing its
own restrictions on egg imports from other parts of Canada. Apparently it hopes to
persuade the other governments taking part in the conference - of Manitoba, Ontario,
Nova Scotia and Canada- to do likewise. The argument raised to justify this is that the
judgment applies to Manitoba alone because its egg-control regulations are slightly
different from Quebec's; but this is a thin excuse, since it was the principle of provincial
interference with interprovincial trade, not the fine details, which the court condemned.
We trust the other governments at the conference will refuse either to follow Quebec's
policy disregarding the Supreme Court decision, or to be drawn into some pact or arrangement to get around it.
In this connection, a particular responsibility rests with the federal cabinet. Prime Minister
Trudeau stated last June 29 that he would enforce the Supreme Court's ruling against
barriers to inter-provincial trade. Now is the time to carry out that pledge, even if it
requires such a drastic and unusual step as disallowance, by the federal government, of
any contrary provincial laws."
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within Canadian federalism? 20 It is not explicitly provided for in the text of
the B.N.A. Act and the Confederation Debates do not reveal an explicit
agreement that it should be adopted. In fact, the preamble to the B.N.A. Act
indicates an intention to establish a constitution similar in principle to that
of the United Kingdom. As Dicey was to record shortly thereafter, the basic
principle of the British constitution is parliamentary sovereignty and British
courts do not have the power to review and invalidate legislation. Perhaps
this aspect of the British model was inapplicable to a federal system of divided
legislative authority. However, there is no record of an explicit consensus and
decision among the Fathers of Confederation that Canadian federalism did
require judicial review and there is some indication they believed conflicts of
jurisdicton would rarely arise. 21
Yet judicial review did come to be exercised in Canada immediately after
Confederation and encountered so little inquiry or debate that it must have
been tacitly assumed by everyone to be proper. An understanding of its legal
basis at that time is important for anyone who is assessing the continued
viability of the institution one hundred years later. By virtue of the Colonial
Laws Validity Act of 1865, which clarified earlier judicial practice, colonial
statutes would be void for repugnancy, if they conflicted with Imperial laws
extending to the colony. Colonial courts, as well as the Privy Council, has
customarily reviewed "subordinate governmental legislation" in the colony
and assessed their legal validity in this way. The B.N.A. Act was an Imperial
statute extending to the colony of Canada and it explicitly authorized legislative jurisdiction only when it fell within certain "exclusive" areas allocated
to either the Dominion or the provinces. When either of these subordinate
bodies purported to act beyond the powers created by the British statute, its
legislation would conflict with an Imperial law, thus triggering the Colonial
Laws Validity Act. Hence, a private citizen affected by any Canadian law
could always impugn the validity of these laws by persuading a court that it
was inconsistent with the superior Imperial law, which the court was dutybound to consider in deciding the instant case.
It is because of this legal background that Canadian constitutional theory
has never enjoyed a debate, similar to that in the United States since Marbury
v. Madison,22 about the propriety of judicial review of legislative action.
There is no logical necessity about judicial review in a federal system, even
though federalism of its very nature involves the creation of limited legislative
powers. A further inference is still necessary to show that the ordinary courts
have the final "say" in determining whether legislation duly enacted by a
representative body is ultra vires and thus null and void. Indeed, there was
explicit provision in the B.N.A. Act for a political forum as a possible vehicle
for enforcing the federal limitations. This was the provision for dominion
disallowance of dominion statutes. However, the constitutional conventions of
the British Empire in 1867 prevented the question even from arising in the
2

0Probably the best recent treatment of the origins of judicial review under the B.N.A.
Act is Strayer, supra, note 6, ch. 1.
21See the comment of Sir John A. MacDonald, quoted in Strayer, supra, note 6
at 15-16.
22 (1803), 5 U.S. 137.
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Canadian legal environment as to whether the existence of an explicit, political
avenue for review excluded the implicit, judicial alternative3P
Given this fundamental assumption about the legal rationale of judicial
review, certain further implications seemed natural. The first corollary is
that any ordinary citizen who is affected by the operation of allegedly invalid
statutes should have standing to require that the Court adjudicate upon his
claim to unconstitutionality. If a statute is sought to be applied to him, he
should be able to impugn the validity of the statute by appealing to the more
fundamental law defining the competence of the enacting body. A second
corollary deals with the question of whether constitutional powers are
exclusive or concurrent. The notion that there is a basic law setting out
spheres of legislative jurisdiction suggests strongly that the courts may hold
legislation invalid because it encroaches on the constitutional authority of
another jurisdiction, even where the latter has not passed inconsistent legislation, or perhaps had not occupied any part of the field at all. What if the
competent legislatures have not only refrained from exercising their exclusive
powers but have also granted permission to the other legislatures to act as
they did? A third logical corollary of the constitutionality of judicial review
in classical federalism is that such delegation is impossible. It offends against
the principle that the basic constitutional law is the source of a limited and
subordinate authority in the legislatures, and they are not entitled, even by
mutual agreement, to amend the original legal scheme which belongs to the
people (or at least to their surrogate, the courts).
This view of the source of judicial review within our federal constitution
and its legal corollaries is internally coherent and was originally plausible.
I suggest, though, that later developments have lessened considerably the case
which can be made in defence of judicial review at2 the
same time as the
institution has become even more solidly entrenched. 4
In fact, the course of events in Canada may be symptomatic of logical
tendencies in any federal system.25 In the first place, why are federal unions
created? The reason is that the constituent units face the need for mergerusually because of an external threat -but cannot accept total legislative
unity. Political, economic, social and cultural concerns are simply too divisive.
Hence the constitution-makers strike a political compromise and divide up
the various governmental functions in a way which best serves these opposing
interests in unity and diversity.
At the time of the merger there is great appeal in the view that the written
bargain is really a fundamental law, and that it has a sufficient core of legal
23 "The constitutional law of the Empire in 1867 apparently embraced the convention
that where legislative powers were granted subject to limitations the courts would enforce
these limitations. The B.N.A. Act was drafted anid enacted in this context". Strayer, supra,
note 6 at S.
24
The Statute of Westminster (1931) which removed from Canadian legislatures
the basic disability of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, had to make an explicit exception
(by Sec. 7(1), (3)) for the British North America Act's distributing legislative power in
order to preserve the legal basis for judicial review.
25 An excellent study in the comparative politics of federalism is W. H. Riker,
Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).
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meaning to be left to the administration of the ordinary courts, even at the
behest of the private individual. Why is this so? First, the negotiators of the
federal union have been able to canvass the governmental functions which are
important at that time, and to reach a decision about the body to which they
are to be allocated. The language which is used to describe these functions
is likely to be fairly accurate, and in any event, there is a sufficient substratum
of common understanding and practice to admit of coherent and objective
interpretation even in the difficult marginal cases. Secondly, the very reasons
for the creation of a federal (and only a federal) union in the first place require
an impartial arbiter to administer these controls. The original federal bargain
reflected important and divisive interests in allocating some functions to the
central government while protecting local autonomy with respect to other
legislative activities. These needs continue to be deeply felt during the time
that the institutions of the new federal union develop authority and support,
and an impartial arbiter is a necessary source of assurance that the original
bargain is being adhered to.
Each of these conditions for the "law-like" character of a federal
constitution gradually erodes as the document ages. There are two related
reasons for this tendency: first, social change eventually renders most of the
original federal bargain outmoded; secondly, a constitution of its very nature
is difficult to amend. There are several kinds of changes which are relevant
to a federal constitution. The original functions which were explicitly allocated
by the draftsman substantially change their character in ways which are
significant to their proper distribution. 26 New social problems arise and
demand legislative responses which were not foreseen by the draftsman, and
thus must be dealt with in terms of the residuary clauses in the constitution.27
The governmental units themselves change their character and capacities for
legislative action, both positively and negatively. 28 Fundamental values in
society change so that the principles which shaped the original federal bargain
are altered. 29 The cumulative result of all these tendencies is that, to the
largest area of constitutional decision-making, the original written understanding becomes simply irrelevant to the real human and social issues with
which governments must deal.
On the other hand, as I have said, amendment of a federal constitution
is necessarily difficult, and the Canadian experience certainly verifies this.3o
26 A good example in this category is the growth of the rehabilitative ideal in the
criminal law, which gave rise to the difficult problem of the constitutionality of the federal
Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3 in A.-G. of B.C. v. Smith, [1967] S.C.R. 702.
27 An illustration of this category is the device of orderly marketing of farm products,
which has been the subject of the cases discussed earlier, culminating in the Manitoba
Egg Reference.
28

One can contrast the move of Quebec into the international arena with the problems
of a tiny province like Prince Edward Island in the modem world.
29 Among these important new values I would include the equalization of social
security protections in different regions, the nationalization of basic freedoms, and the
trend toward positive economic (as well as the older cultural) activity of the FrenchCanadian majority in Quebec.
30 There have been only three explicit amendments to the distribution of legislative
power under the B.N.A. Act in over one hundred years, and these occurred only with
respect to the ambit of Dominion power over social security.

1973]

S.C.C. and CanadianFederalism

There are a number of parties to the bargain, they have important conflicts
of interest, and conventionally now they must unanimously agree on any
explicit change. Not only is it politically difficult to secure constitutional
amendments, but the perception of this difficulty exacerbates the problem.
If everyone knows that an amendment is, practically speaking, almost irrevocable, it becomes much more difficult to persuade a jurisdiction to concede
certain constitutional powers for immediate reasons, when the long-term
significance of the change is necessarily unforeseeable. Finally, the longer
the document remains unchanged, the easier it is for those who are opposed
to specific amendments to appeal to the constitution's symbolic and traditionladen character.
In such a legal situation, it is not defensible for a court to say that its
only function is to apply the "law" as it is written and, if the proper authorities
do not amend the constitution to keep it in tune with changes in society,
the resultant misfit is not the responsibility of the judges. This attitude is
founded on the pseudo-positivist assumption that the "law" inheres in the
conventional linguistic meaning of the words used in a document and remains
"there" unaltered, waiting to be applied by a later judge whatever be the
changes in the social context into which he is to insert it. On the contrary,
I believe it is impossible to separate the meaning of a legal proposition from
the context of the procedure in which it was originally enacted, the demands
of the situation within which it was created, and the purposes or intentions
of those who drafted it.31 Only by reference to these elements does a judge
arrive at a meaningful interpretation of the content of the rules which he is
legitimately required to administer. As this content recedes into insignificance
because of the growing dichotomy between the frozen constitutional language
and the rapidly changing society, a court inevitably begins to elaborate a new
constitutional law in the course of adjudicating about novel and unforeseen
problems. This is the objective import of the court's work, even though
judges may disguise their responsibility - either from themselves or from
others - through adoption of a very abstract and legalistic reasoning style.
The major thrust of constitutional literature in Canada in the last thirty
years or so has been built on this insight into judicial responsibility for
constitutional innovation. Writers have been concerned not only to describe
the nature and extent of judicial alteration of our federal structure but also
to articulate the factors which ought to influence the court in allocating
legislative power to one jurisdiction or another. As Professor Lederman
has so aptly put it, constitutional cases require the court to answer the
question, "Who is the better physician [for a social problem] - the Dominion or Provincial governments?"3 2 What triggered this appreciation of the
true nature of constitutional decision-making was a series of unfortunate
judicial decisions in the inter-war period, more than a half century after the
birth of the Canadian constitution.
31 "A word is not a crystal, transportation and unchanged; it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and
the times in which it is used." Mr. Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner (1918), 245 U.S.
418 at 425.
32
Lederman, Thoughts on Reform of the Supreme Court of Canada (1970), 8 Alta.
L. Rev. 1 at 4.
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These cases dealt with challenges to some radically different legislative
schemes, which were not within the experience of those who were drafting
the specific categories of the B.N.A. Act, and thus had to be classified by
the Court in terms of the general or residual clauses of the document. Not
only did this process place more onerous technical demands on the court
than it had been accustomed to in its earlier period of more genuine
interpretation but it graphically showed how the process of federal allocation can be distorted by judicial lack of familiarity with, or sympathy for,
the policies imbedded in new statutes. 33 In any event, the courts produced
a series of decisions whose total impact was a constitutional straitjacket that
prevented an adequate political response to Canadian social needs. There was
a strong consensus among constitutional writers that these cases had to be
either over-ruled or ignored. Yet this meant that in the very areas where
judicial review was faced with vital and controversial issues, the growing legal
inadequacy of the constitutional document was not remedied by the articulation of stable judicial authorities and principles. However, the recognition
of judicial responsibility for constitutional choices, and the hope for new
directions in constitutional policy, led to the call for final appellate authority
in the Supreme Court of Canada. The expectation was that a Canadian court,
composed of Canadian judges, might produce a higher quality of judicial
adaptation to social change - especially since these judges would have to
live in the same society whose political institutions they were helping to mould.
A second theme in our constitutional literature has now emerged and
is founded on this frank recognition of judicial responsibility for constitutional
change. The natural question to ask is whether our courts - especially the
Supreme Court of Canada- are institutionally equipped to make the judgments required for rational policy-making. It is easy to see why lawyers are
attracted to the notion of constitutional reform through judicial change. It is
legally possible to assert that the court is merely engaged in adjudication of
new situations, that the decisions are available as of right and are authoritative, and that changes can be spaced out in an orderly and incremental way.
Yet real difficulties emerge as the courts try to perform the task and we begin
to realize that they are performing it. Recognition of these difficulties has led
to important recent proposals for the redesign of the Supreme Court to
improve its constitutional performance.
Our first concern may be with the quality of judge-made constitutional
policy. There are two important requirements for intelligent policy-making:
the decision-maker must be apprised of the relevant data, and he must have
the kind of background and expertise which enables him to assess the data
intelligently. The adversary process of adjudication, though it may be an apt
instrument for developing a true picture of a specific event, is hardly the way
to portray the complex and ambiguous character of a changing Canadian
society in a way relevant to the demands of federalism. If a constitutional
issue is raised collaterally in actual litigation, the judge gets some idea of how
his decision will affect real-life relationships but there is a great risk that this
picture will be biased by the fact that he sees only the abnormal case that went
33 A fine study of the constitutional performance of the courts in this era is Mallory,
Social Credit and the FederalPower (1954).
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to court. In a reference case, he is saved from this danger, but only at the
expense of being completely lost in an abstract judicial world.
Nor can we seek the answer in judicial notice of the relevant facts by wise
and statesmanlike men appointed to the Court. Judges are recruited from a
very narrow stratum of society -middle-aged and respectable lawyers- a
practice which is justified on the ground that we want courts to adjudicate
specific disputes within a framework of law. It is only by accident that men
picked for this purpose will be able to perform the special and rather esoteric
function of federalism (which, after all, is only a small percentage of the
court's decision-making function.) Nor are they likely to become educated in
the realities and necessities of government in a federation by the haphazard
and accidental character of -the litigation which happens to move them into
action.
Various structural changes have been suggested. 34 One is the deletion
or downgrading of the private law function of the Supreme Court. This would
supposedly free the Court for further exposure to and education in the policyladen questions of public law. It might also justify the appointment of people
without an emphasis on narrow legal expertise. It has also been suggested
that use of extrinsic aids (such as Brandeis briefs) will enhance the judges'
appreciation of the relevant alternatives and better enable the Court to judge
between them. Perhaps the most fundamental revision advocated in this
direction is -the removal of constitutional decision-making from the ordinary
courts of law, and the creation of a specialized constitutional tribunal. The
tribunal could be composed of non-lawyers as well as lawyers, and presumably
could also be equipped for and charged with the task of making independent
investigations of the direction in which Canadian constitutionalism should
proceed.
Before assessing these proposals, I would first trace the other line of
criticism of the present structure of the Supreme Court and show how it
connects up also with the suggestion of a constitutional court. It is not enough
that constitutional decisions be well researched and reasoned, and be produced
by our constitutional experts. The apparent surface authority of our law and
of legal decisions depends on a broad-based consensus about the legitimacy
of the body which produces them. Absent such a consensus and it will not
be long before the losers will be loath to accept voluntarily the decisions that
go against them. Unfortunately, when judicial responsibility for constitutional
innovation is made evident, and commendably so, its legitimacy must soon
come into question. It is one thing to justify judicial review on the grounds
that there is a supreme law, agreed upon at the founding of the nation, which
34
Important contributions to the literature about the design of the Supreme Court
include: Abel, The Role of the Supreme Court in Private Law Cases (1965), 4 Alta.
L. Rev. 35; Morin, A Constitutional Court for Canada (1965), 43 Can. Bar Rev. 545;
LeDain, Concerning the Proposed Constitutional and Civil Law Specialization at the
Supreme Court Level (1967), Revue Juridique Th6mis 107; Strayer, supra, note 5; Russell,
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1968). 6 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1; Russell,
ConstitutionalReform of the CanadianJudiciary (1968-69), 7 Alta. Law Rev. 103; Morin,
Le Qudbec et rArbitrage Constitutionnel (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 608; McWhinney,
"A Supreme Court in a Bicultural Society" in Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation(1967).
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must be applied by the Courts in evaluating the legality of the enactments
which these subordinate institutions have produced. It is quite another thing
to justify judicial review when it is seen for what it really is - a continuous
process of constitutional development and evaluation which is used by the
courts to strike down legislation enacted by the democratic and representative
institutions in our society.
The reason why continual judicial innovation is necessary is that constitutional amendment is so difficult to achieve. The reason why constitutional
amendment is so difficult is that any revision of legislative authority involves
vital, unforeseeable, and almost irrevocable alterations of political power.
As a result, the interested parties can rarely agree on explicit changes. Yet,
if this is the nature of constitutional amendments, it is difficult to see why
such changes will be any more acceptable when they are unilaterally implemented by the Courts. The only way that political institutions can live with
this possibility, once they perceive its existence, is to attempt to gain control
over the court which is making the decisions.
Within this perspective the Supreme Court of Canada exhibits a basic
flaw. The source of an umpire's authority is his impartiality, which assumes
his lack of special dependence on any one side. However, the members of
the present Court are all picked by the federal government which has an
unfettered discretion in evaluating their competence and attitudes. Moreover,
the Constitution does not guarantee the status of either the Court or its
members after they are selected. Instead, the judges are all paid and protected
in their tenure under a statute which is within the sole legislative authority
of the federal parliament. Legally speaking, the impartiality of the umpire of
federalism may be said to exist at the sufferance of one side to these disputes.
It has been the contribution of French-Canadian analysis since the Tremblay
Report to point this out and to call for the necessary changes. Those who
favour a fundamentally different "constitutional court" propose that such a
body should have a constitutionally entrenched status and tenure and that
its members should be selected proportionately by both the federal and
provincial governments.
Let me summarize this very simplified sketch of the intellectual history
of judicial review in Canada. Judicial review was originally justified in terms
of the duty of the ordinary courts to apply all the relevant law in the adjudication of concrete disputes in Canada. In particular this required measuring
the subordinate Canadian statute against the terms of the more basic British
law which had legally created the limited law-making powers in the first place.
After a period of time (fifty years or so) social and political changes rendered
the specific sections of the frozen constitution largely obsolete, and the courts
were required to base their decisions on the vague residuary clauses. Criticism
of the content of these decisions, and the constitutional strait jacket which
they appeared to place on the Canadian political structure, led to a call for
a much less legalistic and more policy-oriented view of the judicial function
in Canadian federalism. It was not long, though, before it was recognized that
the Supreme Court of Canada - designed as it was for the job of adjudication
- was not really capable of meeting the demands of constitutional policymaking. Yet, as the proposal emerged for the redesign of the Court for the
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better performance of its constitutional function, the institution which finally
emerges as ideal is a body which is not really a court at all.
In the course of this sustained intellectual critique of judicial reviewof the way it is and should be carried on - the one question which is never
asked is the most fundamental of all. Should we continue to have any judicial
review at all in Canadian federalism? 35 As I have said, the original rationale
for review was in terms of the ordinary courts applying a law. However, the
contemporary reality, as reflected in the Manitoba Reference, is that there
is no longer a meaningful law to apply and the present function of federal
umpiring appears unsuited for the adversary process of the ordinary courts.
If I may put the matter a little more bluntly than did Mr. Justice Hughes,
current judicial review in the Supreme Court of Canada means that the Court
is holding legislation valid or invalid on the basis of standards which it is
making up as it goes along. If this is indeed true, we must seriously ponder
whether our constitutional structure has outgrown the role of judicial umpire.
Obviously I cannot demonstrate my thesis about the lack of law in
Canadian federalism decisions from one case and I cannot in this lecture
document my view that the Manitoba Reference is a typical example. 36
However, my review of all the constitutional cases in the Supreme Court of
Canada since 1949 has suggested two pronounced trends. First, the substantive
direction of the Court's constitutional policy is in favour of a gradual and
sensible widening of the ambit for legislative action. This is particularly the
case for the federal Parliament which the Court- in deed though not in
word - no longer attempts to restrict in any significant way. As regards the
provincial legislatures, while the trend has been less marked, there has been
a relaxation of judicial control in the sixties. The Court still intervenes
occasionally - if only to remind everyone that it still has the last word.
The cases in which the Court does intervene and tries to draw a negative
constitutional line, exhibit the second pronounced trend. This is the Court's
inability to articulate any general principle which shows why some provincial
statutes are valid and others are not. For example, the Supreme Court simply
did not apply to the facts of the Manitoba Reference any legal standard which
could fairly be said to have controlled the decision in Carnation Milk, 37
though the legal and functional problems presented by the cases are very
similar. I am no great admirer of the reasoning style of the Supreme Court
of Canada and its continued failure to articulate legal rules and distinctions.
However, I do believe there is something about the subject-matter itself which
35 1 have found only two sustained analyses of this basic question in the Canadian
literature: Clokie, Judicial Review, Federalism, and the Canadian Constitution (1942),
8 Can. Journal of Economics and Political Science 537; Mallory, The Courts and the
Sovereignty of the Canadian Parliament (1944), 10 Can. Journal of Economics and
Political Science 165.
361 have attempted to do so in an article reviewing all the federalism cases in the

Supreme Court of Canada since 1950, which will appear in a forthcoming issue of the
University of Toronto Law Journal.
37 These cases deal with state legislation placing allegedly unconstitutional burdens
on state commerce. See Benson, supra, note 18, Part 3. A typical critical comment about
the Court's inability to articulate any viable legal standards is in Freund, The Supreme
Court of the United States (Cleveland, World Pub. Co., 1961) at 99-100.
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accounts for much of the inadequacy of our constitutional opinions. For
example, the Supreme Court of the United States in this same area of
federalism also no longer tries to restrict the national government and even
its admirers are unimpressed by the reasoning in the few opinions which still
try to control the statutes. When a court is working with a document which
is at least a century old, which cannot be amended to deal with completely
new legislative issues, and is required to allocate political power to one
question-begging verbal category or another, how does it justify its conclusion? It is easy to support a conclusion in favour of the validity of immediate
legislation because it is invariably the case that each jurisdiction has some
legitimate reasons for acting in the area. However if one seeks to invalidate
challenged legislation on the grounds that the other jurisdiction has a compelling claim to exclusive control, what standards or principles are available
which can resolve the essentially political controversy? 38 To the outsider,
constitutional adjudication resembles nothing so much as compulsory, interestdispute, labour arbitration, and is equally devoid of legal standards.
The analogy with compulsory arbitration is instructive. Ordinarily, if an
issue is politically charged and there are no established legal standards which
are applicable to it, we do not believe it can be satisfactorily resolved by an
adjudicative body such as a court (or an arbitration board.) Yet sometimes
the political (or bargaining) process is not a viable alternative and judicial
intervention is better than nothing. 39 I do believe that federalism cases (such
as the Manitoba Reference) involve essentially non-legal conflicts which will
not be dealt with very successfully in the judicial process, and thus courts
should avoid the area unless their intervention is absolutely vital. I must still
address the question whether a federal system - in particular, Canadian
federalism - really does need a judicial umpire to survive in an acceptable
way.
The lawyer's natural response is, "of course, we need a federal umpire
because how else will we resolve conflicts between different governments,
when each believes it has a distinctive legislative claim in a particular area?"
One of the most basic tenets of the lawyer's ideology is that where there is
conflict, there must be a neutral and authoritative body -preferably a court
- which can render a decision to resolve the conflict. If there is no procedure
for making binding decisions about disputed issues and thus enforcing the
rules against those who are tempted to non-compliance, one may wonder
how the legal system or any part of it could long survive. Yet further reflection
should suggest that law without judges- in particular, federalism without
an umpire - is at least possible, if not probable and desirable. Who has not
38

An apt recent example is the controversy about provincial control of cable
television, especially in the educational or cultural sphere. The legal background is
reviewed in Atkey, "The Provincial Interest in Broadcasting under the Canadian Constitution" in The Confederation Challenge, Vol. 2 (1970). The responsible minister in
Quebec, Jean-Paul L'Allier, has indicated that he would not feel bound by a Supreme
Court adjudication in this novel and murky area. (See Toronto Globe and Mail, November
27, 1971, at 10).
39 Administration of a Bill of Rights may be an example, especially in certain areas
such as due process. I am analyzing this issue in depth in another article, and mention it
here to make clear that I do not feel restriction of judicial review in the sphere of federalism
is inconsistent with the expansion of the judicial role in protecting civil liberties.
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played in a game which has successfully been carried on within the rules
but in the absence of an umpire? Further, the plausibility of the role of the
court as an umpire of our federal rules must be substantially lessened when
we fully appreciate the fact that the court is developing the rules of the game
as it goes along. Constitutional conflict is not always so bad and, even when
it is, I doubt that judicial review can make a durable contribution to its
resolution.
Instead, it seems to me that a federal system is precisely the kind of
relationship for which an external umpire may not be necessary and in which
the better technique for managing conflict is continual negotiation and
political compromise. In fact, Canadian federalism exhibits many of the
conditions which are highly conducive to bargaining. There is a small number
of governments; they are constantly talking to each other; they are dependent
on each other's co-operation in many different areas; there is always room
for trading in new or recurring problem areas, and they are quite capable of
spending the time and energy to formulate a compromise. Occasionally,
perhaps, an issue may arise in which compromise appears impossible because
neither side can make any concession from its vital interests. However, this is
precisely the area where unilateral imposition of a settlement by an unresponsive body such as the Supreme Court will be equally unacceptable. It will
require the further techniques of political bargaining to secure the effective
implementation of the judicial decision in any event.
It is sometimes suggested that, in the more typical and less critical
issues which might be resolved by compromise, the process of bargaining
will be enhanced by the presence in the background of a neutral umpire who
could provide an authoritative ruling in the case of disagreement. If the
experience in the labour area is any indication the contrary is true and there
is a real possibility that the availability of the judicial alternative may actually
hinder the achievement of more functional solutions through compromise.
The aura which surrounds courts tends to convert real but limited conflicts
of interest into an artificial controversy over basic principles. Adjudicative
responses to a dispute ordinarily speak of absolute legal rights - enjoyed by
one party and not the other - rather than recognizing each has political
claims of varying weight. Negotiations are usually more productive in an
atmosphere where somewhat ambiguous claims may be gracefully conceded,
one in return for another, rather than one side having to give up its rights
which are guaranteed it by the court.4
Hence, I suggest that as lawyers we must take a new view of the process
of constitutional policy-making, a view which emphasizes the political character of these issues and their awkward fit with adjudication. There is good
reason to believe that the original participants of Confederation assumed a
high degree of political interdependence which would deal with federal conflicts
through these resources, and the tacit assumption that judicial review was
merely residual. The legalistic cost to Canadian constitutionalism may have
4

0 For this reason, it is particularly unfortunate that matters are referred to the

courts for a "legal" decision in the midst of ongoing negotiations. A classic example of

this is the Offshore Oil Reference, [1967] S.C.R. 792, which is criticized in McWhinney,
Federal Supreme Courts and Constitutional Review (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 578 at
599-600.
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been appropriate in our earlier years as a nation. However, both the federal
and provincial governments have matured along with the rest of our society
to an extent that makes the categories of exclusive, self-contained legislative
functions no longer tenable. We must allow the representative governments
to decide not only whether affirmative legislative action is desirable for a
social problem but also whether it is the appropriate body to enact such
legislation. The court should not have the job of making the latter, equally
political, decision.
It is no doubt possible, even likely, that both the federal and provincial
governments would decide that they should act and that joint occupancy of
the field would be awkward. However, this is a reason why the two competing
jurisdictions should negotiate a solution whereby one agrees to retreat and
let the other have full sway. Such arrangements would be devised by reference
to guidelines drawn from earlier patterns of legislative behaviour, reciprocal
concessions, threats of sanctions, and the usual paraphernalia of political (or
other) bargaining and compromise. It is true that sometimes a governmental
consensus may not emerge and citizens who are subject to two sets of laws
with somewhat uncoordinated policies will find this rather uncomfortable.
What should be the role of our courts in this situation and how is it relevant
to my main proposal? First of all, it is a minimum demand on a legal system if not of its logic, at least of its "internal morality" - that citizens not be
subjected to contradictory laws, and courts must have the power to refine
the administration of the legal order to prevent this situation arising. Even in
a unitary legal system, there are potential cases of legal conflict because of the
existence of multiple decision-makers in any complex society. The courts in
such a society are required to play the narrower (though still vital) judicial
role of interpretation of the relevant statutes to avoid legal conflicts and then
application of doctrines of paramountcy to resolve the few remaining situations
of unavoidably contradictory legal rules. Undoubtedly the courts in a federal
system must also perform this function and no doubt it will arise even more
often because of the very nature of federalism.
On the other hand, I do realize the possibility that the courts can become
almost as involved in the politics of federalism, through the apparently more
limited vehicle of paramountcy than they would be when assessing the
validity of laws enacted under exclusive legislative powers. The corollary of
my general thesis about the role of courts in a federal system is that the scope
of judicial action in this sphere should be confined to the same range as in a
unitary legal system. Where a court sees that there are two statutes apparently
relevant to one factual situation, it must first interpret the meaning of the
statutes to see whether each is really applicable. Only if this results in an
directives, should the court proceed to hold
inescapable contradiction of legal
41
one of these to be inoperative.
41 My review of the federalism cases in the Supreme Court in the last 20 years
suggest that this happens only rarely, as it did in A.-G. of British Columbia v. Smith,
[1967] S.C.R. 702, and A.-G. of Ontario v. Policy Holders of Wentworth Insurance Company et al., [1969] S.C.R. 779. The extent to which the courts can use interpretation to
avoid apparent conflict is well-illustrated in cases such as Re Validity of Sec. 92(4),
Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 910, and Fawcett v. A.-G. of Ontario and
A.-G. of Canada, [1964] S.C.R. 625.
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An appropriately restricted judicial role would not allow for the application of vague doctrines of "occupying the field" or "pre-emption" to find
"implied" conflicts when two legislatures have each tried to deal with the
same problem. 42
Where the solutions adopted by the two legislatures are not legally
contradictory then, even though the court believes the legislative policies to
be somewhat incompatible, it should leave it to the legislatures to take
responsibility for creating an explicit conflict and thus invoking the doctrines
of paramountcy (and facing the electorate for the results, whatever they may
be.) The only possible exception to this logic might be the case of provincial
laws burdening inter-provincial trade, and thus harming the economic interests
of the citizens in other provinces to whom the legislating province is not
electorally responsible. My own view is that the only limitation on provincial
laws in this area should be a prohibition on discrimination against extraprovincial citizens or products. Absent a finding of such discrimination, the
that
federal government should have the exclusive jurisdiction to decide
43
provincial laws are an undue interference with the national market.
The key remaining question concerns the content of the paramountcy
doctrines which should be adopted in a federal system where the role of the
courts is to be minimized. The natural conclusion is that there should be one
easily applicable rule, singling out one jurisdiction's legislation as dominant.
There seems also no doubt that, if such is the character of the rule, the
dominant jurisdiction must be the Dominion Parliament, which is responsive
to the whole electorate, including voters in the province whose legislation is
being overridden. The argument will be made, of course, that this gives the
national government the legal power to erode the federal system through a
gradual process of self-aggrandizement. My response is that legal possibility
does not equal political feasibility and that we can and must rely on the
44
political constraints of the federal system to ensure that this does not happen.
How effective is the political process likely to be as an alternative to
judicial review in resolving lack of co-ordination in legislative regulation?
I believe that one of the reasons why we may be reluctant to trust the
political agencies to do this job is the very existence of judicial review as
an alternative and ultimately authoritative decision-maker. This has diverted
our attention from the need to devise machinery which can do this job.
However, there are important lessons to be learned from two areas of Canadian federalism where judicial review is almost completely non-existent:
(i) control of the economy through monetary and fiscal policies; (ii) the provision of services, social security, welfare, etc. Here we have no set of legal
rules dividing up the exercise of governmental power, administered and
enforced by the courts from the outside. Instead, there is the superficially
"messy" situation of freedom for experiment and initiative which often gives
42 These American or Australian doctrines have not found favour in Canada, as the
Supreme Court decision in Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238 illustrates.
43
This is essentially the position of Mr. Justice Black in the United States Supreme
Court; see discussion in Benson, supra, note 18.
44See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism (1954), 54 Columbia L.
Rev. 543.
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rise to conflicts of policy. However, as a result, a conventional framework
has been developed within the federal constitution to co-ordinate the concrete
policies as they are developed. This seems a much more fruitful exercise than
attempting to define exclusive, abstract, and permanent areas of governmental
jurisdictions. 45 There is no reason to suppose that, with the withdrawal of
judicial review from the field, the same process would not be repeated in
the sphere of legal regulation. In fact, I believe that we are much more likely
to achieve a satisfactory atmosphere for consensus if we are striving merely
for agreements, which can be altered or revoked, rather than an over-all
Agreement, which is constitutionally frozen.
My concluding remarks must bring this discussion back somewhat closer
to the reality of the Twentieth Century in Canada. I certainly do not believe
this proposal for the abolition of judicial review will be implemented for a
long time, if ever. The primary point of my analysis though, is to provide
a framework for consideration of current discussion about the procedures
for constitutional decision-making- especially the proposal for a constitutional court. The real issue now is not whether we should have judicial review
or not, but rather how much of it should we have and how it should be
carried on. In my view, abolition of judicial review is the ideal, but I am
more concerned with immediate practical steps towards minimizing either
the incidence or the harm from review. Instead of trying to alter the Supreme
Court in ways designed to make it a better constitutional umpire, let us try
to reduce as much as possible the significance of this function in its work.
The most important conclusion which is suggested by my analysis is
one directed to the Supreme Court itself - the political desirability of judicial
restraint in the area of federalism. In fact, in the last twenty years, perhaps
for some of the reasons I have suggested, there has been a gradual but marked
relaxation of the federal restraints placed by the Court on our legislatures.
We can predict some real legislative tests of this new judicial attitude in the
next twenty years, especially from some more adventurous regulatory statutes
from the federal Parliament. If, as I hope, these statutory innovations are
consistently sustained against legislative attack, we might approach very
closely the functional abolition of judicial review, and simply through the
low-visibility, incremental process of judicial change.
There is one procedural change which would help this judicial retreat,
and which might be politically feasible now. It involves a sharp tightening
of the law of standing to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute. The
implications of what I suggest are graphically illustrated by the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision in the Bell Telephone case 46 (one of the few recent
decisions actually holding provincial legislation to be invalid, even in part).
Here Bell Telephone resisted a government suit for over $50,000, a levy
which was imposed under the Quebec Minimum Wage Act on the grounds
that the Act could not constitutionally apply to Bell Telephone and its employees because they were within the dominion regulatory jurisdiction under
45 See Smiley, "Devices of Adjustment in the Canadian Constitution", Constitutional
Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970),
ch. 4.
46 Commission du Salaire v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.R. 767.
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S. 92 (10). It should be noted that the constitutionality of a direct taxing
statute as applied to Bell could not have been attacked, but the legality of
this administrative levy depended on the constitutional validity of applying
the general scheme of the statute to regulate Bell's minimum wages, maximum
hours, etc. The Court accepted the company's constitutional argument and
thus rejected the provincial government's monetary action.
In my view, there is something wrong with a legal system which allows
a private business to impeach in this way the validity of laws enacted by a
representative legislature. The Act had been in existence for a long time and,
along with similar employment legislation (such as the Child Labour Act),
had been understood to apply to all companies employing people in Quebec.
The federal government had not enacted similar social legislation dealing
with industries within its own jurisdiction, and there was no evidence that it
had ever objected to provincial laws setting such minimum standards for
companies such as Bell. Suddenly, because they are faced with a monetary
suit, the company raises a legal defence which is not once but twice removed
from the legitimate interests it has in the dispute. As a result, the Supreme
Court responded with a ruling which created a shadowy enclave of business
immunity from provincial regulation. 47
From the perspective within which I view the role of judicial review in
constitutional law, I would propose that we not allow private individuals of
their own motion to impeach the validity of statutes on the ground that they
infringe the "exclusive" jurisdiction of another legislative body.48 (By analogy,
we do not allow taxpayers' suits or defences on the grounds of the alleged
unconstitutionality of the expenditure of tax revenues.) Hence, I would
suggest that we not only require the private citizen to give notice of a constitutional challenge to the offending jurisdiction (as we do now), but that
we also require that he obtain consent for this challenge from the AttorneyGeneral of the jurisdiction whose "turf' he is defending. The only time that a
private citizen should have a legal claim in his own right to a constitutional
decision is when there are two contradictory statutes from contending jurisdictions and he is asking for the minimal judicial decision about paramountcy.
In cases such as Bell Telephone where there is no contlicting legislation,
it is obvious that the province had a legitimate interest in the substance of
its attempted regulation of Bell Telephone, even though we might agree with
the Court that the federal interest was more compelling. If the federal government wants to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this area, then it should either
intervene to challenge the constitutionality of the provincial law (or its
application) or, better yet, enact its own statute implementing the pattern of
471 might add that the Court had two competing legal precedents and analogies from
which to choose, one upholding the application of provincial Workmen's Compensation
legislation to these Dominion industries, the other case denying the application of the
provincial minimum wage legislati6n in the Dominion postal service. Rather casually
and, I think, incorrectly, the Court opted for the second analogy and held the employment
standards statute constitutionally inapplicable to Bell Telephone. The decision is sharply
and accurately criticized in Gibson, InterjurisdictionalImmunity in CanadianFederalism
(1969), Can. Bar Rev. 40 at 53-56.
48 See Strayer, supra, note 6 at 117-20. A recent case refusing to hear a constitutional
challenge brought by a taxpayer is Thorson v. A.-G. of Canada (2), E1972] 1 O.R. 86.
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legislation it prefers. Nor should we be deterred by the predictable response of
the lawyers, who will protest that we are depriving the private litigant of his
right to a judicial examination of the validity of a statute which might affect
his position in a legal dispute. It makes sense to talk of legal rights only when
there are meaningful legal rules imposing a legal obligation on one actor,
and which we then feel justifies conferring on another the right to enforce
the duty. 49 In my view, though, the process of constitutional decision-making
in Canada has outgrown its original legal context, and the Supreme Court is
simply engaging in ad hoc dispute resolution (as typified in the Manitoba
Reference). If the best we can hope for from our judicial umpire is a Delphic
utterance - valid or invalid - is there really any reason to allow the private
litigant to consult the oracle? 50
Elimination of the power of the private citizen to lodge a unilateral
challenge to the validity of a statute on federalism grounds would sharply
lessen the incidence of judicial review and resolution of constitutional questions.51 It would require the creation of much more extensive procedures for
inter-governmental consultation in the area of conflicts of regulation. I believe
we can assume that the Coughlin52 case has removed almost all of the
significant limitations on the power of governments to agree to alterations of
legislative power, at least where administrative agencies are involved (which
is the almost invariable case in the area of legal regulation in any event.) If
this is true, we can expect much the same ad hoc consensual adjustments and
arrangements in this area as are found regarding economic policy or social
security. This will force the interested governments to face their own responsibilities for the essentially political and technical questions of allocation of
government responsibility in such fields as pollution control, wage and price
regulation, competitions policy, Canadian economic nationalism, etc. It will
enable these decisions to be made in a forum much more conducive to an
informed and acceptable resolution of the immediate problem, without undue
fear of a "legal" or principled precedent. If access to judicial review is made
49

See the analysis of the concept of a legal right in Hart and Sacks, The Legal
Process(Cambridge, Mass.: 1958) at 114 ff.
50 By contrast, Strayer, supra, note 6, favours a widening of the use of judicial review
to settle federalism disputes, in particular by elimination of standing barriers. His proposals
are based on a view of constitutional decision-making which is epitomized in this statement:
"A resort to the courts might clarify the legal position, so that attempts at a resolution
of such conflicts could at least proceed on an intelligent basis. Otherwise the constitution
will be lost sight of in the welter of federal-provincial negotiations constantly in process.
Without a clarification of the constitutional position, many of these proceed on a basis
of political accommodation: the respective bargaining strength of the parties is measured
by popular support, not legal right. In the process, the fundamental values embodied in
the constitutional division of powers may be completely overlooked. A return to law is
now required."
51 However, the decline in the importance of judicial review is well underway, even
without this change, for reasons sketched in Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism" in Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism: Myth and Reality (Toronto, London:
Methuen, 1968) at 51-64.
52Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport Board, [1968] S.C.R. 569. The dissent

in this case is the best authority for the specious distinction the majority were trying to
draw from the Nova Scotia Inter-delegationReference, [1951] S.C.R. 31, a decision which
apparently is still part of our constitutional "law".
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more difficult and an alternative political forum is set up to canvass the issues
at the first stage, then many of the questions posed to the Supreme Court
since 1949 would never bother a court again. It is even possible that we
could become accustomed to the demise of judicial review and it might
gradually wither away of its own accord.
In this paper, I have tried to sketch the logic in the evolution of some
of the fundamental ideas of Canadian constitutionalism. At the root of any ongoing intellectual discipline there are certain paradigm assumptions which
define the direction of enquiry at any one time. 53 Ordinarily, the participants
in this intellectual enterprise do not focus on and question these assumptions.
This is as it should be because no collaborative progress in understanding
could ever be accomplished unless there is tentative agreement about the
fundamental concepts. After a period of time, though, incongruities and
discontinuities in these assumptions begin to make themselves felt in specific
problems and their cumulative result begins to dissolve the established
consensus. When this occurs, we are ready for the articulation of a new
framework for inquiry which can redirect the intellectual search along more
satisfying avenues. I believe we are at this stage in our current assessment
of the judicial umpiring of the federal system.
As I have said, judicial review originated with the notion that the
Canadian constitution - the British North America Act - was an Imperial
statute and thus fit for administration in the ordinary courts of law. The
logical corollaries of this view were that private citizens had standing to
require the court to invalidate subordinate Canadian laws which were beyond
the powers of the enacting legislature because they went beyond the limits
laid down by this Imperial statute. Moreover, this finding of invalidity could
be made by the courts even though the actual recipient of the legislative power
had not yet exercised it, because its legislative jurisdiction in the area was not
concurrent. In fact, the original donee of this legislative power could not
even consent to its exercise by the other jurisdiction through a form of interdelegation because of the binding and authoritative character of the basic law.
This originally coherent paradigm began to fall apart because the demands
of social change for redistribution of political authority could not be reflected
in explicit amendments to the constitution. The burden was placed on the
courts to make the necessary adjustments and this immediately placed them
in a dilemma. Taking one view of the nature of their role, they could adhere
to the letter of the original document which would only have the effect of
placing a constitutional strait-jacket around our governmental institutions. On
a more adequate view of their obligations, they could begin consciously to
update the original allocation of legislative authority in the light of current
social needs. Unfortunately, this appeared to result in severe pressures on the
structure of a judicial process which was designed for the adjudication of disputes within a framework of law.
The discontinuity which is thus apparent in Canadian constitutionalism
lies in the incapacity of the institution of the ordinary court to perform the
53 The notion of "paradigm" I have drawn of course from Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, a work which is extremely helpful in trying to understand changes
in fundamental intellectual assumptions.
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function of constitutional innovation and adjustment. When we perceive the
discontinuity, it is no longer difficult to discover the reasons for its existence.
A statutory enactment which has been effectively frozen for more than a
century, but which purports to govern as fluid and politically-charged an area
as the allocation of legislative authority, must inevitably lose its legal integrity
no matter how wide a view we may take of the nature of law. I have suggested
that when we perceive the true character of constitutional decision-making in
the courts, at least the corollaries of traditional judicial review must be altered.
We should no longer allow private citizens' standing to impeach legislation on
the grounds that it has encroached on the exclusive preserve of another legislative body. As far as citizens are concerned, this would leave the constitutional
regime with the legal status of "functional concurrency", except in the rare
cases of contradictory enactments to which the courts must apply a rule of
paramountcy. Moreover, the courts would no longer interfere with legislative
power to make ongoing adjustments in the allocation of legislative jurisdiction
through various techniques of delegation. Each of these doctrinal changes is
based on the recognition that we do not have a system of constitutional law
which citizens have a right to have applied to their disputes in court. Rather,
we have a political process of adjustment of our governmental institutions to
social change. The primary source of such adjustment must be a continuous
process of bargaining and compromise and it is the respective governments
rather than the private litigants and the courts which must be seen to have the
direct interest and responsibility to preserve the integrity of Canadian federalism.
In many respects the "law in action" is not too far removed from these
proposals. Private litigants are rarely successful in securing Supreme Court
decisions which invalidate legislation (although their theoretical standing to
do so has, if anything, been strengthened by the B.C. Power case). Functional
concurrency appears to be the operative rule at least in the area of penal
regulation of private behaviour. 54 The limitations on legislative inter-delegation
after the Coughlin case appear to be little more than verbal (if uncontrolled
"incorporation by reference" is to be permitted). Nonetheless, judicial review
continues to be an ever-present possibility and it appears unquestioned that
the courts must remain the final and authoritative umpire in cases where the
political institutions do not agree about the allocation of jurisdiction. For the
reasons I have given, I would draw the further conclusion that federalism
disputes are inherently non-justifiable and, in the absence of meaningful legal
standards, the Court should not be asked to intervene in these essentially
political disputes.
I would conclude my analysis of the judicial contribution to the future
of Canadian federalism by a loose paraphrase of the conclusion to a famous
analysis of the courts' contribution to labour relations. 55 "The federal allocation
of legislative authority is an integral part of our system of self-government.
When it works well, it does not need the sanction of constitutional law. It is
only when the system breaks down that the Court's aid is invoked. But the
54 See Leigh, The Criminal Law Power: A Move Towards Functional Concurrency
(1967), 5 Alta. Law Rev. 237.
55 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labour Relations (1955), 68 Harv. Law
Rev. 999 at 1024.
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Supreme Court cannot, by occasional sporadic decisions, restore the parties'
continuing relationship and its intervention in such cases may seriously affect
the on-going system of self-government. When their autonomous system breaks
down, might not the parties better be left to the usual methods for adjustment
of political disputes, rather than to court actions on the constitution? I suggest
that the law stay out - but, mind you, not the lawyers".

